Two players engaged in the Prisoner's Dilemma have to choose between cooperation and defection, the pay-off of the players is determined by a weight w = ( T , R , P , S ) . For deterministic strategies p 1 , … , p n we consider a society
Introduction
Since its formulation in 1950, the Prisoner's Dilemma has become the leading metaphor to investigate rationales for cooperation (see [1] , [4] and [7] for extensive literature lists). Two players engaged in the Prisoner's Dilemma have to choose between cooperation and defection.
The players confront each other indefinitely often, receiving in each round R points if they both cooperate and P points if they both defect; moreover, a defector exploiting a cooperator receives T points, while the cooperator receives only S points. It is assumed that T > R > 0 > P > S and 0 > T + S , the last condition implying that it is not worth for a player to cooperate and defect alternatively while the coplayer is cooperating. A tuple w = ( T , R , P , S ) satisfying the above conditions is called an admissible weight.
The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) offers rich possibilities for ingenious strategies. Most of the literature on the topic deals only with stochastic strategies (see for example [7] 
and [8]).
A deterministic strategy p = ( { a 0 , a 1 , … , a n } , f 0 , f 1 , s ) is given by a finite set { a 0 , a 1 , … , a n } of states, where a 0 is a distinguishedinitial state ; f 0 and f 1 are transition functions of the states and s is the outcome function assigning 0 or 1 to each state, where 1 stands for cooperating and 0 for defecting. Hence a deterministic strategy is a finite automaton (see [2] ).
Deterministic strategies may be depicted as finite oriented valued digraphs, as in the following examples, where → indicates the initial state and the values of s are written on the vertices.
Strategy TFT is the famous tit-for-tat strategy: cooperate in the first round, then do whatever the other did last time. Since the well-known Axelrod ' s tournaments [1], tit-for-tat has been considered the major paradigm of altruistic behaviour [4] and [5] . Strategy PAV (for Pavlov) was introduced by Nowak and Sigmund [9] and shown to outperform TFT in computer runned simulations of heterogeneous sets of probabilistic strategies. Our computer programs show that the intolerant strategy I 0 outperforms all deterministic strategies with two states and I 1 outperforms all deterministic strategies with at most three states.
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Let p 1 , … , p n be deterministic strategies and consider a society S = S ( u i : p i | i = 1 , … , n ) formed by individuals playing at random the IPD with admissible weight w (i.e. in each round, two individuals are chosen randomly to play the next step of the corresponding IPD, each individual recalling their last play against one another and responding accordingly), among them, 0 < u i individuals use strategy p i . We shall assume that there is an unlimited number of rounds, all occurring with probability one. (For certain considerations of the IPD it is assumed, see [1] , that the next round happens with probabilityw < 1 . The limiting case w = 1 is usually of great interest, see [8] for a discussion). Many interesting problems arise from the consideration of the terminal pay-off of an individual x in the society S , where g ( t ) ( x ) is the pay-off accumulated by x in the first t rounds. Observe that, for the sake of simplicity, we omit the dependence on the parameter w , but we may write for g S ( x ) if we want to stress the parameter w of the IPD.
In Section 2, we show that in case the individual x uses strategy p i , then 
enough. More precisely, let u be the number of individuals in S .
Lemma.
We have g ( t ) ( x : y ) ≥ 0 as long as .
Proof.
By hypothesis g 1 ( p : 
2.4.
The next Proposition only expresses the fact that, after a preperiod, all the confrontations between individuals enter in a tournament-cycle determined by their strategies.
Proposition. The proof is complete. □ 3. Stability 3.1. In the case of a homogeneous society ( n = 1 ) , this is equivalent to
Let S = S ( u i
:
Let w = ( T , R , P , S )
which is a condition in the limit of ESS as defined in [6].
3.2.
We recall that a strategy p = ( { a 0 , a 1 , … , a n } ,
Lemma.
Let p , p ′ be two strategies. Then
(ii)
If p and p ′ are retaliatory, then either g ( w ) ( p : . If x uses the strategy p i , this is equivalent to
where u is the column vector with i th entry u i , that is, the individual x gets a higher pay-off from being part of the society S than if it were to form a society with individuals playing the same strategy p i .
Proposition.
The society S = S ( u i : p i | i = 1 , … , n ) is w -successful if and only if
Turn MathJaxon where g ( w ) is the column vector whose i th entry is g ( w ) ( p i : p i ) . □
4.2.
Consider the vector space V = R n . A cone K in V is a closed subset satisfying: Theorem.
Let p 1 , … , p n be deterministic w -self-supportive strategies and G ( w ) = ( g ( w ) ( p i : p j ) ) be the terminal pay-off matrix. The following are equivalent:
There exists a society S ( u i : p i | i = 1 , … , n ) which is w -successful. There exists a vector 0 ≪ u ∈ R n such that
Proof. Let p 1 , … , p n be deterministic strategies. Then the following are equivalent:
is weakly positive, i.e. for every vector 0 ≠ v ∈ R n with nonnegative coordinates we have . Proof. Proposition.
Let A be a symmetric matrix and q ( x ) = x t A x the associated quadratic form. The following are equivalent:
q ( x ) is weakly positive. In this section we shall discuss in which way the former results depend on the fixed admissible weight w with which the IPD is played. The discussion is motivated by remarks of a referee of the paper.
Let w = ( T , R , P , S ) satisfying be an admissible weight . Given p and p ′ two deterministic strategies, we denote by g ( w ) ( p : p ′ ) the relative pay-off of p playing the IPD with initial conditions w against p ′ .
The set of admissible parameters w ∈ R 4 satisfying g ( w ) ( p : p ′ ) ≥ 0 together with the origin 0 form a cone C ( p : p ′ ) in R 4 . Moreover:
, that is, the pay-off of an individual playing the strategy p is lower than the pay-off of another playing the strategy p ′ , independently of the initial conditions. Proof.
Observe that for w , w ′ admissible parameters and r > 0 we get admissible parameters w + w Corollary.
There is a canonical class which is open. If w is an admissible weight in a canonical class, then
Observe that the points ( 1 Corollary.
There is a finite partition C 1 , … , C m of the admissible weights such that the following holds:
(i) the closure of each C i is a convex cone;
(ii) for any two admissible weights w , w ′ , E S ( w ) = E S ( w ′ ) if and only if w and w ′ belong to the same set C i for some i . With the values of T , R , P and S as in 6.1, the pay-off matrix G is 
